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Derrida and the End of the World
Sean Gaston
He advanced his course
Far past the blazing bulwarks of the world, and roamed the whole
Immeasurable Cosmos in his mind.
—Lucretius1
The world (haolam, tevel) and the world to come (haolam haba) are often cited in texts from the Tanakh, but in the Torah there are only three references to something like a concept of 
world. Two of these occur in Genesis in the descriptions of the great 
flood at the time of Noah. In Everett Fox’s remarkable translation, 
inspired by the work of Martin Buber, God announces to Noah, “I 
. . . will blot out all existing things (et col hayehkum).”2 This concept 
of the world is not created at the moment of creation––at the start of 
Genesis, there are only “the heavens and the earth”––but at the mo-
ment of destruction.3 I will blot out all existing things. This is only the 
first gesture in a long tradition. Imagine there is no world, no kosmos, 
no mundus, orbis, or universitas. Imagine there is no world, if you can. 
From René Descartes to Edmund Husserl and perhaps to Jacques Der-
rida, the disappearance of the world has become a persistent trope in 
Western philosophy.
Derrida insists on a certain “end of the world” in his later work, but 
one should not confuse this with either more traditional apocalyptic 
narratives or with the Cartesian or Husserlian erasure and annihila-
tion of the world in the name of the cogito or the phenomenological 
reduction as the possibility of transcendental consciousness. According 
to Derrida, the end of the world is the only possible response to the 
death of the other. It is part of the task of marking death as other, of 
challenging the tradition of harnessing “the tremendous power of the 
negative” from G. W. F. Hegel to Martin Heidegger.4 At the same time, 
this announcement of the unavoidable end of the world also assumes 
that there is a world that must end. Derrida was very attentive to the 
fictions that arise from announcing the closure or the opening of a 
world and, particularly in his reading of Immanuel Kant, he attempted 
to counteract a programmatic fictionality linked to the concept of world. 
new literary history500
However, the most significant aspect of this work on the fictions and ends 
of the world arises from Derrida’s fifty-year engagement with the thought 
of Husserl. In his earliest work, Derrida questioned Husserl’s notion 
of the lifeworld and later resisted the removal of the relation between 
space and time in the phenomenological reduction. As his reference to 
the work of Eugen Fink and his readings of Jean-Luc Nancy suggests, 
Derrida also retains a phenomenological difference to mark the world. 
There is a concept––or rather a difference––of world in Derrida’s work. 
The Whole World
In the left-hand column of Derrida’s Glas (1974), the concept of the 
world does not appear until he retraces Hegel’s account of the flood. 
It is perhaps not entirely surprising that he describes the philosophical 
tradition of analyzing the biblical flood as the construction of a fiction. 
When it comes to the end of the world, we are always dealing with a 
certain relation to the fictional and the virtual. Derrida writes: “Like 
Condillac, like Rousseau, Kant and some others, Hegel resorts to a kind 
of theoretical fiction: the recital of a catastrophic event reconstitutes 
the ideal-historic origin of human society.”5 Glossing Hegel’s account 
of Deucalion and Pyrrha and the Greek myth of a global flood, Derrida 
observes: “After the flood they invited men to renew their friendship 
with the world, with nature” (G 39a).
What is striking about this first use of world in the reading of Hegel is 
that Derrida is clearly paraphrasing Hegel: this is a Hegelian Welt. The 
question of whether there is a concept of world in Derrida’s thought in 
this period is even more acute when the next instance of world in Glas 
is explicitly put in the voice of others. In a dialogue between Hegel and 
“the doctors of castration” (which may stand for Sigmund Freud and 
Jacques Lacan), “Hegel” responds to their call to recognize “the truly 
feigned” castration by remarking: “If we are not concerned with a real 
event, all of you must talk at great length, even spin tales, in order to 
describe or fulfil the conceptual structure of what you call castration; 
you must recount a legend, make a whole network of significations in-
tervene; frankly speaking, you must make the whole world [tout le monde] 
of signification intervene, beginning with the relief [Aufhebung], truth, 
being, law and so on” (G 43a; 53a). On the following page, Derrida will 
formally quote Hegel using the always slightly tautological phrase, “the 
whole world (monde tout entier)” (G 44a; 54a).
According to Derrida’s “Hegel,” the legitimation of the “truly feigned” 
(le vraiment feint) requires the evocation or the construction of “the 
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whole world.” Speaking as Hegel, Derrida suggests at the very least 
that one can read the “whole world” as a phrase in quotation marks, 
as a phrase placed in parentheses, as a suspension of the “world.” In 
his reading, Derrida takes care not to speak of the “world” or of the 
“whole world” in his own name. This caution around one of the old-
est of metaphysical props is compounded by his emphasis on the traps 
and ruses of the fictionality of creating––or ending––a world. Derrida 
attempts to displace the “truly feigned” fiction of the concept of world 
within the philosophical tradition.
How does one approach the world of Derrida’s world? The use of world 
here to denote a body or genre or corpus of thought of the world as 
an umbrella term to coordinate or demarcate a distinctive collection is 
particularly problematic. Derrida uses monde in this sense in his reading 
of Kant in “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy” 
(1983). In writing of “numerology, mystic illumination, theophanic vi-
sion––all that indeed belongs to the apocalyptic world,” he refers to “the 
vast and overabundant corpus of the apocalyptic ‘genre.’”6 The “genre” 
or “world” of world, Derrida suggests, cannot be gathered into a retro-
spective unity and, most of all, when it comes to announcing “the end 
of the world” (OA 24, 28). As Kant had suggested in the Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781), to take a vantage point on the world in its entirety––on 
the whole world of the world in Derrida’s thought––presupposes a 
theological fiction. In such circumstances, one would need to act “as 
if this experience constituted an absolute unity,” “as if the sum total of 
all appearances (the world of sense itself) had a single supreme and 
all-sufficient ground outside its range.”7
Le jeu du monde
Derrida’s association of world with a “theoretical fiction” and an 
“ideal-historic origin” in Glas evokes his earliest work on Husserl, and 
this is where we need to begin to understand his relation to the world 
and its end. In The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy (1954), Der-
rida is preoccupied with Husserl’s problematic notion of the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt). For Derrida, there is “a serious ambiguity in the concept 
of ‘world’” in Husserl’s later thought because it accounts for both an 
“antepredicative” reality and the “predicative” possibility of judgments.8 
He writes:
On the one hand, the world is the antepredicative in its actual “reality.” Always 
already there, in its primitive ontological structure, it is the preconstituted sub-
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strate of all meaning. But on the other hand, it is the idea of an infinite totality 
of possible foundations of every judgement. In it are opposed the actuality of 
existence as substrate and the infinite possibility of transcendental experiences. 
Which makes the problem of genesis take a new turn. The world as infinite 
horizon of possible experiences cannot itself be a predicate or a modalization 
of the “real” antepredicative world. It is originarily an infinite horizon of the 
possible, as a great many texts indicate. (PG 110) 
The “lifeworld” marks a formal contradiction in Husserl’s thought: it 
claims to be at once the real and the possible. The world is a real origin 
or the origin of the real and also “an infinite horizon of the possible.” 
The phenomenological world registers an impasse. As Derrida observes, 
“a formal a priori possibility” cannot produce “an antepredicative mo-
ment of the existent or of an actual, that is to say, ‘finite,’ totality of 
existents” (PG 110).
On the one hand, if one begins with world as possibility, consciousness 
has no origin in concrete existence, and it will invent and fabricate its 
world and terminate in a psychological and subjective cul-de-sac (PG 
110–11).  This is not only a question of hermetic fictional worlds worthy 
of Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote, but also of reality being described 
through the “idealization” of logical concepts. In such a case, the real 
world and concrete existence would disappear. On the other hand, 
Derrida observes, Husserl still “presents the antepredicative world . . . 
as the always present actuality of the given,” insisting that there is also 
“the world of experience, in the most concrete and most everyday sense 
of the word.” The phenomenological world leaves us with two incom-
patible assertions: there is no world, there are only my fictional worlds, 
and there are no fictional worlds, there is only the one and everyday 
world (PG 111–12).
Thirteen years later in Of Grammatology (1967), Derrida gives us a 
glimpse of a concept or trope of world in his own work. Encounter-
ing the inheritance of the suspension of the world in transcendental 
phenomenology and its intricate connection to Dasein in Heidegger’s 
thought, Derrida can neither adhere to a clear denial nor to a persistent 
affirmation of world. Certainly, there are worlds that are quoted from the 
works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Descartes, Karl Jaspers, Franz Kafka, and 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, which often carry the heavy resonance of a quotation 
that should be placed in double quotation marks. For example, when 
Derrida quotes Lévi-Strauss’s description of “the lost world” (le monde 
perdu) of the Nambikwara, who are called a people “without writing.” 9 
However, there are also passages where Derrida appears to use 
a concept of world in his own name. What kind of world is a stake 
when he writes of “the ineluctable world of the future” in the Exergue 
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(OG 5)? Though in this case, it is precisely a question of a “future world” 
or “monde à venir,” a world to come, a world “which breaks absolutely 
with constituted normality and can only be proclaimed, presented, as a 
sort of monstrosity” (OG 5). But why evoke the world at all? Why retain 
a concept of world, even of a world to come? If Derrida cannot entirely 
dispense with the concept of world, how are we to read his insistence 
that “our entire world [tout notre monde] and language would collapse” 
without the exteriority of writing in general (OG 14)? Does writing, as 
trace and différance, then save the world for us? Does it preserve that 
which it can also destroy?
On the first page of Of Grammatology, Derrida refers to a concept of 
writing that is “in a world where the phoneticization of writing must 
dissimulate its own history as it is produced” (OG 3). What does it mean 
to have a concept of writing that is “in a world” (dans une monde)? Must 
writing always be in a world? A few pages later, Derrida gestures to one 
of the key problems in addressing the concept of the world: 
The system of “hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak” [“s’entendre-parler”] 
through the phonic substance––which presents itself as the nonexterior, non-
mundane, therefore nonempirical or noncontingent signifier––has necessar-
ily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even 
produced the idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, that arises from the 
difference between the wordly and the non-wordly, the outside and the inside, 
ideality and non-ideality, universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and em-
pirical, etc. (OG 7–8)
The phonocentric tradition casts language not in the world (the exterior, 
mundane, empirical, and contingent), but as the origin of the world. 
Language is the transcendental possibility of the world. It is itself entirely 
free of the world: intelligible, necessary, and universal. Without the ide-
ality of the phonē and the logos, there would be no “idea of the world.”
According to Derrida, despite the careful construction of a transcen-
dental internal time consciousness, Husserl cannot avoid “the time of 
the world” (OG 67). And despite his evocation of being-in-the world, 
Heidegger succumbs to a notion of language “which does not borrow 
from outside itself, in the world” (OG 20). We are left with what Derrida 
calls “the game of the world” (le jeu du monde) (OG 50). The challenge of le 
jeu du monde, Derrida argues, is to think of a writing “which is neither in 
the world nor in ‘another world,’” of a writing that marks “the absence 
of another here-and-now, of another transcendent present, of another 
origin of the world” (OG 65; 47). 
In “Structure, Sign and Play” (1966), Derrida had associated le jeu 
du monde with Friedrich Nietzsche’s “joyous affirmation of the play of 
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the world and the innocence of becoming.”10 Derrida refers here to 
Nietzsche’s description of the world as a “game” or “play of forces,” a 
continual becoming, passing away and destruction that Heraclitus had 
compared to the innocent play (paidiá) of a child.11 Derrida was also 
inspired by the work of Eugen Fink.12 In Nietzsche’s Philosophy (1960), Fink 
had written: “The cosmos plays. . . . It plays joining and separating, weav-
ing death and life into one beyond good and evil and beyond all value 
because any value only appears within the play.”13 From his reading of 
both Nietzsche and Husserl, Fink argued that one should not take the 
measure of the world through things or beings in the world but think 
of the world––from “the origin of the world.”14
For Derrida, the play of the world suggests that one can avoid think-
ing of world within the traditional Aristotelian structure of container 
and contained. As he remarks in a discussion from 1979: “On the basis 
of thinking such as Nietzsche’s (as interpreted by Fink), the concept of 
play, understood as the play of the world, is no longer play in the world. 
That is, it is no longer determined and contained by something, by the 
space that would comprehend it.”15 Twenty years after Of Grammatology, 
Derrida described Heidegger’s notion of “the play of the world” in Of 
Spirit (1987) as a concentric “becoming-world of world” that always tends 
toward “collecting together” (Versammlung).16 Derrida also implies that 
Heidegger’s use of world remained tied to the assumption of a “clear 
difference between the open and the closed” (OS 54). How does one 
open or close a world?
Derrida suggests in Of Grammatology that language may relieve us of 
unrelenting reality, writing may evoke times long gone or even create 
wondrous fictional narratives, but it cannot engender another world, a 
clear escape or unbroken repose that is always elsewhere. If there is a 
world in Of Grammatology, it is a world that provides neither ground nor 
pure possibility but is also a world that cannot be avoided or circum-
vented. We never stop passing through, finding ourselves in the midst 
of that which we are neither truly in nor truly above.
What Can the World Do?
It is at this point that we need to return to Derrida’s reading of 
Husserl and his lifelong fascination with the phenomenological reduc-
tion.17 In “Et Cetera . . .” (2000), written some forty-six years after The 
Problem of Genesis, Derrida was still emphasizing the importance of the 
phenomenological reduction for his work, as a putting in parenthesis 
or placing in quotations that marks a relation to “a heterogrammatic 
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writing.” He also described the phenomenological reduction as a series 
of multiplying reductions that leaves language polyphonic and reinforces 
“the impossibility of an absolute metalanguage.”18 Derrida’s reaction to 
the phenomenological reduction can be described as both a profound 
resistance to an attempt to put aside the world as an index of space and 
time and the evocation of the world as the chance of a total destruction. 
Derrida resists the disappearance of the world and imagines its end.
In The Problem of Genesis he implies––perhaps under the influence of 
Jean Hyppolite––that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction should be 
understood as a kind of Hegelian Aufhebung. As he writes of Husserl: 
“More and more, he insists on the difference that separates neutraliza-
tion from pure and simple negation. Reduction is not skeptical doubt or 
ascetic retreat into immanence as lived experience. It conserves what it 
suspends. It maintains the ‘sense’ of the object whose existence it ‘neu-
tralizes’” (PG 71). Derrida goes on to highlight that Husserl’s reduction 
of “the ‘thesis’ of the natural attitude” begins with the world, with the 
“spatio-temporal world” as “a total world,” or “the whole of being in its 
infinity and its incompletion” (PG 72). It is important to point out here, 
as Geoffrey Bennington has often done, that for Derrida the concept 
of incompletion remains within the teleology of the phenomenological 
analysis. 19
As Maurice Blanchot observed in The Space of Literature (1955), com-
menting on Paul Valéry’s celebration of the “infinite quality” of the 
literary work: “That the work is infinite means, for him, that the artist, 
though unable to finish it, can nevertheless make it the delimited site 
of an endless task whose incompleteness develops the mastery of the 
mind, expresses this mastery, expresses it by developing it into the form 
of power.”20 Infinite, incomplete, defined, as Derrida writes, by a time 
and space that are “indistinctly mixed,” the world according to Hus-
serl constitutes “my natural environment.” It is this natural world that 
Husserl submits to the uplifting, the negation and conservation, of the 
phenomenological reduction.
In his attempt to distinguish the perception of physical things from 
mental processes in Ideas I (1913), Husserl insists that while the positing 
of the pure Ego is always necessary, the positing of the world is always 
contingent.21 He goes on to write: “No conceivable proofs gathered 
from experiential consideration of the world could make the existence 
of the world certain for us with an absolute assurance . . . the possibility 
of the non-being of the world is never excluded. The absolute being of 
mental processes is in no respect altered thereby; in fact, they always 
remain presupposed by all of that” (I 103). In his 1962 introduction to 
Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry, Derrida attempts to register the con-
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tingency of the “world” without subscribing to what Husserl calls “the 
essential detachableness of the whole natural world from the domains 
of consciousness” (I 104). 
In §49––which from his first to last works Derrida referred to as the 
“famous” or “celebrated” section of Ideas––Husserl insists that “a veritable 
abyss yawns between consciousness and reality.” He writes: “While the 
being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, would 
indeed be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things 
its own existence would not be touched” (I 110). This end of the world, or 
this fiction of the end of the world as Derrida emphasizes, registers a 
pure consciousness “to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and 
which cannot be within any spatiotemporally complex” (I 112, PG 79, 
OG 95–96).
One can imagine différance and all its contextual reformations in 
Derrida’s work as a sustained reaction to this profound exclusion of 
the spatiotemporal––of spacing and temporalization––in the name of 
the disappearance of the world. As he observed in Speech and Phenomena 
(1967): “The going-forth [la sortie] ‘into the world’ is also primordi-
ally implied in the movement of temporalization. ‘Time’ cannot be 
an ‘absolutely subjectivity’ precisely because it cannot be conceived on 
the basis of a present and the self-presence of a present being. Like 
everything thought under this heading, and like all that is excluded by 
the most rigorous transcendental reduction, the ‘world’ is primordially 
implied in the movement of temporalization.”22 If the annihilation or 
nullifying (Vernichtung) of the world, to use Husserl’s phrase, leads to 
a grand Aufhebung of a relation between space and time (of différance 
as space becoming time and time becoming space), one can also see 
Derrida attempting to work out the possibility of the “end” of the world, 
or rather the threat of its destruction, in which contingency does not 
merely confirm the necessary. 
If the inseparability of the relation between time and space cannot be 
excluded from the possibility of consciousness nor reduced to a matrix 
of external reality, what does the “world” then do? Husserl entitled §49 
“Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the 
World” (I 109). In the wake of what Derrida called “a certain dissidence” 
in his relation to phenomenology, one could begin to think of the “world” 
as the residuum, the remainder that resists, that accounts for the chance 
or risk of a destruction that interlaces the Husserlian division between 
the “external” world and “a complex of absolute being into which nothing 
can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip” (I 112). 23
Derrida opens his introduction to The Origin of Geometry with the 
familiar problem of the lifeworld as both “sensible” and “the unity of 
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ground and horizon” (EHOG 25–26). At the same time, he is more inter-
ested in the world as the “infinite horizon of every possible experience” 
(EHOG 82–83), of a world in which all objects can be taken as theorems. 
He argues that the phenomenological world is part of the ideality of 
language and of the problem of writing, which is also “in the world.” 
In other words, writing catches on the junction between the world as an 
ideal possibility and as an empirical and historical reality. In the later 
Speech and Phenomena, as is well known, Derrida will contrast this to the 
voice as a unique auto-affection that is both untouched by the world 
and the possibility or unity of any world (SP 6, 79).
This tells us what writing can do, but not what the world can do. What 
can the world do? As Derrida remarks, “Factual destruction does not 
interest Husserl at all,” and he brings to his reading of the origin of 
geometry the recognition that writing is part of “the factual worldliness 
of inscription” (EHOG 94).  Writing is an aspect of the constant danger 
of “worldly accident,” of a contingent chance, destruction, and death 
that differs from the ideality of the truth, of the historicity of ideal ob-
jects that remains “absolutely independent of the whole world” (EHOG 
94–96).  Husserl cannot think of the destruction of all existing things.
In contrast, within the context of the vulnerability and contingency of 
all inscriptions, of something less than the uninterrupted transmission 
of the history of the truth, Derrida can imagine “a world-wide burning 
of libraries” (EHOG 94).  As the Torah first suggested, the concept of 
world registers at once the reality, the possibility, and the fiction of the 
destruction of the world. Derrida’s early response to Husserl raises a 
lingering question: is the concept of world as residuum only announced 
by imagining a total destruction, a “catastrophe of monuments,” that 
destroys all existing things ––including this work, this name (EHOG 94)?
As if . . . the world
In August 2002, Derrida delivered the paper “The ‘World’ of the En-
lightenment to Come,” placing le monde in the title in quotation marks. 
As far as I am aware, this is the only work by Derrida before 2003 that 
has le monde in the title. Placing the world in quotation marks, of course, 
evokes the phenomenological reduction. But Derrida was also thinking 
of Kant here, and of a particular idea in the Kantian sense that recon-
figures the world as a legitimated or programmatic fiction and sustains 
a persistent self-evidence or presence.24 Derrida’s interest in the Kantian 
idea of the world also raises the question of the relation between fiction, 
the world, and death in his late work.
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that the transcendental 
ideas of the self, the world, and God are not constitutive but regulative 
principles. There is no direct object from experience that refers us to 
these ideas. As regulative principles, the ideas of the self, the world, and 
God are discerned through an indirect schema that is ordered by “the 
systematic unity of the manifold of empirical cognition” (CPR A670–71/
B698–99). As Derrida noted, Kant includes within the regulative unity 
of these transcendental ideas an indispensable “as if.” The regulative 
unity of the ideas of self, world, and God both facilitate and rely on a 
fiction of the suspended reality of the self, the world, and God. As Der-
rida remarks in the 1999 paper “The University Without Condition,” 
Kantian reflective judgment operates “‘as if’ (als ob) an understanding 
contained or comprehended the unity of the variety of empirical laws.”25 
One must act as if there could be a fictional systematic worldlike unity of 
an empirical unity. At the same time, as Friedrich Schelling suggested, 
following Kant one could both act as if there is a world and as if there 
is no world.26
In “The Reason of the Strongest” (2002), Derrida recalls, “the idea 
of world remains a regulative idea for Kant.”27 We can only grasp the 
idea of the world as if it is the world, if we take “nature in general” as 
a pure systematic unity that has no relation to an object of experience 
(CPR A685/B713). The Kantian logic is wonderful here: we take an 
idea and treat it as if it gives us the object of experience which gives us 
the true gift: a pure transcendental idea. For Kant, this not only gives 
us the freedom to make use of nature as an idea of world, but it also 
reinforces that the world is an idea that “opens up new paths into the 
infinite” (CPR A680/B708).
The world as an idea in the Kantian sense raises a difficult question 
when we turn to Derrida’s marked emphasis on la fin du monde. For 
Kant, when it comes to the idea of world “one leaves it entirely open 
what sort of constitution this ground, which eludes our concepts, might 
have” (CPR A681/B709). As we shall see, la fin du monde may not conjure 
a constituted ground, but it does perhaps rely on the chance of a de-
constitution, of an accidental catastrophic destruction or an implacable 
relation to death. Is it also notable that Derrida did not include the 
“as if” in his account of the la fin du monde in “Rams: Uninterrupted 
Dialogue – Between Two Infinities, the Poem” (2003) or in the avant-
propos to Chaque fois unique (2003)? If we link the death of the other to 
the end of the world, as Derrida suggests in these late works, can we 
avoid finding ourselves taking the death of the other as if it is the end 
of the world? What does it mean to exclude “some virtualization,” which 
Derrida argues is always at work when it comes to the trace, in thinking 
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the death of the other as the end of the world (UWC 211)? Derrida is 
insistent in “Rams”: “Death is nothing less than an end of the world.”28
In “The University Without Condition,” Derrida distinguishes between 
a regulative or programmatic “as if,” a domestication through “legitimate 
fictions,” that can “already be read, decoded, or articulated as such” and 
an irrepressible and nonprogrammatic “if” (UWC 233–34). For Derrida, 
such an “if” would not be confined to the categories of the conditional 
and the possible. He contrasts this “if” without condition to the traditional 
metaphysical gesture of the “as such” which links Hegel, Husserl, and 
Heidegger. The authority of the as such founds “every philosophy and 
justifies every ontology as well as every phenomenology” (UWC 234). 
As Derrida suggests in La bête et le souverain (2002–2003), the as such is 
always the privilege of opening and manifesting, of making manifest, 
of making the other manifest.29 For Heidegger, Derrida argues in this 
final seminar, the world is the manifestation of being as such for human 
Dasein, a manifestation that the animal cannot access (LB 306).
It is perhaps unsurprising that the attempt to put an end to the “as 
such” coincides with a certain end of the world in Derrida’s reading of 
Heidegger in his 1992 paper “Aporias.” For Dasein, Derrida argues, “the 
disappearance, the end, the annihilation of the as such, of the possibility 
of the relation to the phenomenon as such or to the phenomenon of 
the ‘as such’” is “nothing less than the end of the world.”30 Eleven years 
later in “Rams,” Derrida repeats this phrase with more emphasis: “Death 
is nothing less than an end of the world.” Death is nothing less than the 
end of the as if of the as such––as the end of the world. But can I think 
the end of the world without inviting the resurrection or salvation of 
the world-concepts or world-dreams of the world and its end?
La fin du monde
Imagine there is no world, if you can. It seems that this is what the 
world does for Derrida, from his earliest writings on Husserl in 1953 
to his final readings of Paul Celan and Heidegger in 2003. In La bête 
et le souverain, in what would be his final seminar session in late March 
2003, Derrida argues that one could take world to describe that in which 
all humans and animals live and die (LB 306). Warning against taking 
this as a simple containment, loss of difference, or privileging of life, 
he nonetheless evokes the unshakable possibility or risk that there is no 
world, of an islandlike solitude that not only denies a world shared with 
others but the existence of any world.31 One of the possible responses to 
this absence––without salvation––of a present world is to return to Kant 
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and to act “as if we inhabit the same world,” marking the traces of the 
coming and going of this “fragile convention” (LB 368–70).
La fin du monde marks the reality and the possibility or necessary fiction 
of a destruction that is at once unthinkably total and entirely individual. 
In meditating in “Rams” on a line from Celan, “Die Welt ist fort, ich muss 
dich tragen,” Derrida once again responds to the question of the death 
of the other, to death and the other. He writes:
For each time, and each time singularly, each time irreplaceably, each time 
infinitely, death is nothing less than an end of the world. Not only one end 
among others, the end of someone or of something in the world, the end of a 
life or of a living being. Death puts an end neither to someone in the world 
nor to one world among others. Death marks each time, each time in defiance 
of arithmetic, the absolute end of the one and only world, of that which opens 
as a one and only world, the end of the unique world, the end of the totality 
of what is or can be presented as the origin of the world for any unique living 
being, be it human or not. 
The survivor, then, remains alone. Beyond the world of the other, he is also 
in some fashion beyond or before the world itself. In the world outside the 
world and deprived of the world. At the very least, he feels solely responsible, 
assigned to carry both the other and his world, the other and the world that 
have disappeared, responsible without world (weltlos), without the ground of 
any world, thenceforth, in a world without world, as if without earth beyond 
the end of the world. (R 140)
This single and singular death of the other is the end of the world and, 
for a time, I find myself beyond the world, before the world, and with-
out the world. Imagine there is no world, Derrida suggests, and there 
is always a world, the world that I am beyond, before, or without. But 
why do I, or why does the other, have a world? Why do I need a world 
or even the world or its end?
After his paper on Hans–Georg Gadamer in February 2003, Derrida 
returned to the end of the world in the avant–propos to Chaque fois unique, 
la fin du monde. The death of the other should be distinguished from 
the possibility of a world that can be encompassed, a world which can 
appear to and be known in its entirety by a living survivor.32 The death 
of the other is rather “la fin du monde en totalité,” “the end of the whole 
possible world” (CFU 9). Once again, it is a question of imagining or 
accepting total destruction. Importantly, Derrida adds that it is also a 
matter of a total destruction of the entire world each time that there 
is a death of the other. Each time total destruction: an infinite, helpless 
repetition of the singular. Derrida ends his opening paragraph with an 
audaciously short sentence of summation that I would read as a knowing 
joke, as recollection of other worlds and other voices that had been held 
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in parentheses: “voilà ce que voudrait dire ‘le monde.’” That’s it, that’s what 
“the world” means, or means to say. That’s the whole story. 
This impossibly short summation also brings to mind the old but 
persistent echo of Derrida’s analysis of “the hyperbolic audacity of the 
Cartesian Cogito” as the common source of both reason and madness, a 
common source that is announced by Descartes declaring, always exces-
sively, the end of the world. As Derrida had observed forty years earlier, 
for Descartes, “even if the totality of the world does not exist, even if 
nonmeaning has invaded the totality of the world, up to and including 
the very contents of my thought, I still think, I am while I think.”33 As I 
declare the perfect end of the world in the name of reason, I am also 
mad. For Derrida, the madness of the cogito also has an echo in the 
phenomenological reduction, which he describes in “Rams” as “the most 
necessary, the most logical, but also the most insane experience of a 
transcendental phenomenology” (R 160).
Having criticized Husserl’s use of the world as the origin of the possible 
and the possibility of horizon and unity in the avant–propos to Chaque 
fois unique, Derrida also retains here––without relying on unity or hori-
zon––the notion of the end of the world as possibility. The end of the 
world is “the always open possibility, indeed the necessity of the possible 
non–return”: the end of the world as the possibility of an original finitude 
or total destruction (CFU 11). At the same time, having announced the 
world and its end in “Rams,” Derrida is interested in the “distancing” 
and disappearance of the world in Celan’s work (R 153, 158). 
It is Celan who imagines that there is no world as the possibility and 
the necessity of my carrying you and the world after you have died (R 
160). Atlaslike, I will carry the world over and over again, after each and 
after all the deaths. Derrida writes: “No world can any longer support 
us, serve as mediation, as ground, as earth, as foundation or as alibi” (R 
158). The world becomes “an alibi or evasive transcendence,” Derrida 
had observed elsewhere, when I invoke “an other world” (C 57). The ir-
remediable loss of this “other world” interrupts good conscience. After 
the death of the other and the end of the world, one cannot avoid the 
solitude of the survivor: “The survivor, then, remains alone.” Whether 
it is Celan or Derrida speaking as “Celan,” this insistence on solitude, 
and the link between one death and the destruction of the world, was 
articulated long ago by Talmudic scholars as they too studied Genesis 
without rest: “The reason Adam was created alone in the world is to 
teach you that whoever destroys a single soul, Scripture imputes it to him 
as though he had destroyed the entire world; and whoever keeps alive 
a single soul, Scripture imputes it to him as though he had preserved 
the entire world.”34 
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In/Of the World
In the last pages of his reading of Celan, Derrida turns, once again, to 
the worlds of Husserl and Heidegger. Like Celan, Husserl and Heidegger 
also imagine that that there can be no world, that the world can disap-
pear to announce the pure ego of transcendental phenomenology or 
that one can discern a hierarchy of access to the world amongst things 
and living beings (R 160–63). Derrida had noted in Of Spirit that Hei-
degger’s concept of world––the world for Dasein––consistently relies on 
the exclusion of stones, plants, and animals (OS 48–57).35 He had also 
already traced in Glas Hegel’s association of the Jew with a stone that 
has no feeling, no spirit––and no world (G 47a, 76a–79a). There is a 
tradition of imagining that there is no world and we should not confuse 
this with Derrida’s work.
But again, why do I need a world or even the world that will disap-
pear or be lost, the world that has ended of the other that I must carry 
without the world to offer me any support? Why, godlike, do we continue 
to imagine, creatio ex nihilo, that there is an individual world or island 
or a total world that can be entirely destroyed (LB 31)? Is it really, as 
Derrida suggests in Chaque fois unique, only a question of thinking about 
“death” (CFU 9)? How far does Derrida remain tied throughout his work 
to the terms of reference or frameworks of phenomenology? To what 
extent––and in a manner that is different from his relation to Hegel, 
Heidegger, and Lévinas––is Derrida the relentless other of Husserl?
In his introduction to The Origin of Geometry, Derrida had noted that 
phenomenology is founded on a clear difference between what ap-
pears and “the regulative possibility of appearing.” Husserl links this 
possibility of appearing to an “idea in the Kantian sense,” which does 
not itself appear. Not x but the possibility of x, the Kantian idea secures 
the unseen origin or pure possibility of phenomenology––which can-
not itself undergo a phenomenological analysis. This pure possibility, 
this untouchable origin coordinates the phenomenological difference 
between the visible (finite evidence) and seeing (possibility in general). 
This difference also accounts for the possibility “of the world in general” 
(EHOG 138–41). 
Derrida remained remarkably faithful to this difference as a frame-
work for reading the phenomenological tradition. As one of the voices 
observes in the dialogue at the outset of On Touching–Jean-Luc Nancy 
(2000), there is a difference between the “visible (things or objects in 
the world)” and “seeing (at the origin of the world).”36 When it comes 
to the world, there is a difference between in the world (dans le monde) 
and of the world (du monde). It is in marking, or even remarking this 
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phenomenological difference, that Derrida’s work retains something like 
world, world that cannot simply be called a world or the world.
As we have seen, Derrida marks this difference in Of Grammatology by 
referring to the work of Eugen Fink. Fink illustrates in many ways the 
problem of thinking of the world that Derrida takes up once again in 
his reading of Nancy in On Touching. By thinking of the world neither 
in the world nor in another world, Fink’s reading of Nietzsche suggests 
that world is no longer a concept that contains or is contained. It is no 
longer thought in the old matrix of the universe (the uncontained that 
contains), the world (the contained that contains), and things and be-
ings (the contained).37 Thinking of the world, one might think of the 
possibility “in general” of the play of becoming and destruction but also 
of the uncontained, of “the midst” as the uncontained. At the same time, 
Fink was closely associated with Husserl and his argument for thinking 
“at the origin of the world” can also be taken as the possibility in gen-
eral of “the transcendental subject” discovering itself “as the foundation 
of the world.”38 In his 1979 discussion of Fink and Nietzsche, Derrida 
emphasizes, “once play is no longer simply play in the world, it is also 
no longer the play of someone who plays.”39
In the prefatory note to On Touching, Derrida remarks that he has 
most likely often used such “gros mots” as “le monde” in his own work in 
an inexact fashion (OT 7). One can take this as a reminder that it is 
extremely difficult to renounce or reject the concept of world (as Nancy 
does to some extent) and as a play on Nancy’s excessive use of the term 
exactitude, which Derrida appears to allow both as an excess and as an 
echo of a phenomenological idealization (OT 26, EHOG 133). Derrida 
implies that Nancy’s evocation of a spacing to dislodge the concept of 
cosmos reoccupies a phenomenological space.
As Derrida had noted in Of Spirit, worlds are somehow always open-
ing and closing: this difference is an index of the metaphysics of world. 
For Derrida, Nancy’s equation of spacing with “coming into the world” 
as “self-touching”––of spacing as “the world of bodies” that produces 
the world as a “rejection or self-expulsion” of the cosmos––still assumes 
that world is “opened.”40 More tellingly, Derrida reads Nancy’s sense of 
the world (le sens du monde) in terms of a phenomenological gesture of 
the world, of possibility in general: it is a “delivery into the world [la 
mise au monde] as a rejection, but also of the possibility of rejection in 
general” (OT 58). The sense of the world describes “the possibility of 
the world as possibility of ‘its own rejection’” (OT 56). Nancy ascribes a 
finitude to a possibility in general, leaving us with the possibility in general 
of a finitude, a world––at the origin of the world (OT 262, EHOG 141).
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In his avant-propos to Chaque fois unique, Derrida returned to his read-
ing of Nancy. Nancy, he argues, does not accept “the end of the world” 
(la fin du monde). He still holds on to “the end of a world” (la fin d’un 
monde) and this resistance to total destruction, this retaining of the pos-
sibility in general of an individual end, is also a bid for a consolation 
or resurrection that gestures to something that precedes and exceeds 
this total destruction (CFU 11). Derrida once again frames this critique 
of Nancy in terms of the possibility of total destruction. It is a matter 
of recognizing “the always open possibility, indeed the necessity of the 
possible non-return, of the end of the world as end of all resurrection” 
(CFU 11).
In the last pages of On Touching, Derrida returns to the difference 
between the visible and seeing, between in and of the world. In the midst 
of a long sentence, which starts with “I believe and accept,” he draws out 
the differing relations of this difference. On the one hand, he writes: 
“One cannot see anything in the world . . . without the possibility, at 
least, of a reflecting surface that makes visible.” Seeing is blind “in the 
world”: if it is to see it must admit “the possibility” of the visible. Pos-
sibility in general “at the origin of the world” (which cannot be seen 
or touched in phenomenology) must be seen or touched if it is to be 
registered “in the world.” 
On the other hand, Derrida adds a parenthetical comment in the 
midst of this passage, an observation that is placed in parenthesis as it 
talks about world. He writes: “One cannot see anything in the world (this 
is the origin and the possibility of the world that only a world can also 
give).” Seeing (possibility in general, possibility of the world) is blind 
without the visible (finite evidence) in the world, but “in the world” is 
itself also already a structure “of the world,” of “the origin and the pos-
sibility of the world,” of an unseen possibility in general. One could say 
that Derrida never stopped touching this clear difference, of disturbing 
the not x but the possibility of x as the pure possibility of Husserlian 
phenomenology. At the same time, he maintains this difference. To assert 
the end of the world, Derrida must also remark the difference in and of 
the world. As the other of Husserl—as a differing and never absolute 
other––Derrida holds on to both the world and its end.
In “Violence and Metaphysics” (1964), countering Lévinas’s reading 
of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, Derrida had explained that “the other 
as transcendental other” should be seen as “other absolute origin and 
other zero point in the orientation of the world.” Husserl, he added, 
“seeks to recognize the other as Other only in its form as ego, in its form 
of alterity, which cannot be that of things in the world. If the other were 
not recognized as a transcendental alter ego, it would be entirely in the 
world and not, as ego, the origin of the world.”41 Nearly forty years later 
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in “Rams,” he again explained, “When the world has retreated [after the 
phenomenological reduction] . . . the alter ego that is constituted in the 
ego is no longer accessible in an originary and purely phenomenologi-
cal intuition” (R 161).42  The other as other is both the origin and the 
end of the world.
In his discussion at Villanova in 1997 with Jean-Luc Marion, Derrida 
cites this same passage from the Cartesian Meditations again and describes 
it as “a limit of phenomenology that appears within phenomenology.” He 
goes on to define his own work as an attempt “to check the limits and 
possibility of phenomenology.”43 Challenging what he sees as Marion’s 
attempt at a pure escape from phenomenology that also claims to be a 
pure phenomenology, Derrida concludes: “I would like to remain phe-
nomenological in what I say against phenomenology.” Always the other 
of Husserl, the other as other becomes for Derrida the possibility, the 
memory, the fiction, and even the necessity of repeating the difference 
at the origin and at the end of the world. And one can still ask, after 
this heritage of the world, this world heritage from Husserl to Derrida, 
why world? Do we still need a concept of world? Do we still need to speak 
of the world or its end?
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